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I. INTRODUCTION
In McCleskey v. Kemp, McCleskey, a black man, offered statistical evi-
dence (the Baldus study) to prove that racial discrimination exists in the Georgia
death penalty system. Assuming the validity of the study, the Court neverthe-
less refused to accept the Baldus study as proof of discrimination in McCleskey's
case. This paper proposes that statistics evidencing racial discrimination that
relate to the prosecutor's role in seeking the death penalty should be analyzed
within the framework established by previous cases where statistics have been
accepted as proof of discrimination.
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II. FACTS
Warren McCleskey was tried in the Superior Court of Fulton County,
Georgia, for armed robbery and for the murder of a white police officer which
occurred during the robbery. 1 The jury, comprised of eleven whites and one
black, 2 recommended the death sentence for McCleskey. Subsequently, the
Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, sentenced Warren McCleskey to
death. I Unsuccessful in his attempt to seek post-conviction relief in state courts,
McCleskey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus4 in the federal District
Court of the Northern District of Georgia. I
In this petition, McCleskey claimed that the Georgia death penalty statute
allowed for value judgments within the system, and as a result it was being
applied arbitrarily and in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. 6
In support of his claim, McCleskey presented statistical evidence produced
by multiple regression analysis. 7 This statistical evidence (the Baldus study)8
was compiled by Professors David Baldus, George Woodworth and Charles
Pulanski. It demonstrated that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of
the cases involving a black defendant and a white victim, 32 % of the cases where
both the defendant and victim were white, 15 % of the cases where defendant
and victim were black, and 19% of the cases involving a white defendant and
a black victim. 9 One of Baldus'.models, which took into account 39 nonracial
variables, concluded that "defendants charged with killing white victims were
I. McCleskey v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E.2d 146 (1980).
2. Brief for Petitioner at 3, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
3. On automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, McCleskey's death sentence was affirmed.
McCleskey v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E.2d 146 (1980). McCleskey argued that the Georgia death penalty
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because prosecutorial
discretion permits its discriminatory application. Citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), as prece-
dent, the Georgia Supreme Court found McCleskey's argument without merit.
4. A writ of habeas corpus is instituted to initiate a proceeding to command the defendant to produce
the prisoner and to show by what authority he restrains or detains him. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
5. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
6. Id. McCleskey specified two areas where this occurred: one, when prosecutors decide whether to
seek the death penalty, and two, when jurors decide whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at 346.
7. When using multiple regression analysis, a theoretical statistical model of reality is built, then an
attempt is made to control for all possible independent variables while measuring the effect of the variable
of interest upon the dependent variable. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 350 (N.D. Ga. 1984). See
generally for further explanation of regression analysis, R. HEATH, BASIC STATISTICAL METHODS, 129-39
(1970).
8. The study analyzed sentences imposed in homicide cases to determine the level of disparity attributable
to race in the number of death sentences imposed. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 887 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
Each case was examined from indictment through sentencing. Id. Baldus examined over 2,000 Georgia cases,
then subjected the data he collected to extensive analysis, accounting for 230 variables which could have
explained the sentencing disparity on grounds other than racial bias. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 287.
9. 481 U.S. at 287. Similarly, the study showed that the death penalty was assessed in 22% of the cases
involving black defendants and white victims, 8 % of the cases where both the defendant and victim were
white, I % of the cases where both the defendant and victim were black and 3 % of the cases involving white
defendants and black victims.
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4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with kill-
ing blacks."'" After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the district court con-
cluded that McCleskey's statistics did not demonstrate a prima facie case in
support of his contention. "
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the
district court's opinion and found that, even assuming the validity of the Baldus
study, it was "insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent or unconstitu-
tional discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment context [as well as] insuffi-
cient to show irrationality, arbitrariness and capriciousness under any kind of
Eighth Amendment analysis." 2 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari, and in a five-to-four decision affirmed the dismissal of McCleskey's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 11
III. BACKGROUND: STATISTICS AS PROOF
OF AN EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION
The Court analyzed McCleskey's equal protection claim'" by relying on
the basic principle that McCleskey must show the existence of purposeful dis-
crimination, '1 and further, must show that this purposeful discrimination had
a discriminatory effect on him. 16 McCleskey did not offer specific evidence
to show racial discrimination in his particular case, but instead contended that
a statistical study (the Baldus study) "compel[led] an inference that his sentence
rest[ed] on purposeful discrimination."' 7 To evaluate the Court's analysis in
McCleskey's case, previous cases in which statistics have been accepted as proof
of intent to discriminate must be examined.
In the 1976 case of Washington v. Davis, 18 the Court found that a law or
official act is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportion-
ate impact when no other evidence is presented to warrant a finding of pur-
10. Id. at 287. In addition, black defendants were found to be 1.1 times as likely to receive the death
sentence as other defendants. Id.
11. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379 (N.D. Ga. 1984). The district court stated that to prove
this claim McCleskey would have had to establish a specific act or acts that showed he was intentionally
chosen for the imposition of the death penalty because of his race or the race of his victim. Id.
12. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 891 (1 lth Cir. 1985).
13. 481 U.S. at 279-82.
14. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
15. 481 U.S. at 292; accord Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see infra notes 39-59 and accompanying text.
16. 481 U.S. at 292 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); see Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222 (1985); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Per-
sonnel Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
17. 481 U.S. at 292-93.
18. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (In this case, two black men applied for jobs with the Washington D.C. police
department. When they were not accepted, the two men contended that the department's recruiting proce-
dures were discriminatory because all applicants were required to take a language skills test "which excluded
a disproportionately high number of [black] applicants." Id. at 246.).
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poseful discrimination. 19 However, the Court made clear that discriminatory
racial purpose need not be express and that a law's disproportionate impact on
individuals in similar situations is relevant in an equal protection analysis. 20
Citing numerous jury selection cases as examples, the Court stated that "the
systematic exclusion of [blacks from juries] is itself such an 'unequal applica-
tion of the law . . . as to show intentional discrimination."'
21
A. Jury Selection Cases
It is in jury selection cases that statistics have often been used to show a
pattern of facial discrimination within the criminal justice system. For exam-
ple, in the case of Whitus v. Georgia, 22 Whitus alleged racial discrimination
in the selection of the grand and petit juries which respectively indicted him
and found him guilty of murder. 22 To support his claim, Whitus offered statistical
proof which showed that while blacks made up 27.1 % of the tax digest (from
which jury members are selected), only 9.1% of the grand jury venire and 7.8 %
of the petit jury venire were blacks. 24 Noting that the burden rested with Whi-
tus to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination, the Court found the
statistical evidence to constitute "a prima facie case of purposeful discrimina-
tion." 25 The burden then shifted to the state to rebut this presumption. The
state offered no explanation for the statistical disparity between the number of
taxpaying blacks and those on jury venires, nor did the state offer any evidence
indicating that these blacks were unqualified. 26 In light of this, the Court found
the state failed to meet its burden of rebutting Whitus' prima facie case; there-
fore, Whitus' murder conviction was reversed and the state was directed to take
the necessary steps to reindict and retry him. 27
19. Id. at 247.
20. Id. at 241. But cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (In this case, the Court did not accept
the argument that the seemingly permissible ends served by a city ordinance could be impeached by a show-
ing that racial motivations prompted city council action.).
21. Id. (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945)); see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Alex-
ander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935);
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
22. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
23. Id. at 546-47.
24. Id. at 552.
25. Id. at 551.
26. Id. at 552.
27. Id. Other jury selection cases involving the use of statistics include: Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1977) ( 2 to I disparity between Mexican-Americans in county population and those summoned to grand
jury duty); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (primafacie case established where blacks comprised
60% of general population and 37% of jury lists); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (Blacks constituted
26% of those eligible for jury service and comprised 10-15% of the grand jury list. The Court held that
this did not establish a primafacie case by merely showing underrepresentation by "less than 10%."). See
generally Comment, The Civil Petitioner's Right to Representative Grand Juries and a Statistical Method
of Showing Discrimination in Jury Selection Cases Generally, 20 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1973) (suggesting
a statistical methodology to assist courts in determining whether a presumption of discrimination should be
found).
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In Casteneda v. Partida 28 the following statistics were presented to sup-
port Partida's claim of discrimination within the Hildago County jury selection
system: "[T]he population of. . .[Hildago] county was 79.1 % Mexican-
American, but ... over an 11-year period, only 39 % of the persons summoned
for grand jury service were Mexican-American." 29 In analyzing this claim,
the Court set forth three steps a defendant must take in order to show that the
"procedure employed [in the jury selection process] resulted in substantial un-
derrepresentation of his race or the identifiable group to which he belongs."
30
First, the defendant must establish that his group is a distinct class that has been
"singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied." 3 '
Second, he must prove the degree of underrepresentation. 3 2 Third, he must
establish that the discriminatory procedure used is "susceptible of abuse or is
not racially neutral."3 3 In applying this test to the specific facts of this case,
the Court found that the statistics offered established a prima facie case of dis-
crimination against Mexican-Americans in the Hildago County grand jury selec-
tion process. The burden was then shifted to the state to rebut the case. 11 The
state did not offer evidence that racially neutral qualifications for grand jurors
resulted in the low proportion of Mexican-Americans . 3  This, in combination
with the highly subjective nature of the Texas jury selection system 36 and the
ease in which Mexican-Americans could be identified by their Spanish sur-
names, 37 led the Court to the conclusion that Partida had been denied equal
protection under the law by the jury selection process in his case. 38
B. Title VII Cases
The second line of cases in which the Court has accepted statistics as pri-
ma facie proof of purposeful discrimination are those where a claimant has at-
tempted to establish a statutory violation under Title VII. 39 While the case of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green40 did not involve the use of statistics as
proof of racial discrimination, it did establish the basic order and allocation
28. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
29. Id. at 495.
30. Id. at 494.
31. Id.; see Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954).
32. 430 U.S. at 494; see 347 U.S. at 480; see also Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
33. 430 U.S. at 494; see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241; Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. at 630.
34. 430 U.S. at 496.
35. Id. at 498.
36. Id. at 485; the qualifications of a jury member are as follows: "A grand juror must be a citizen of
Texas and of the county, be a qualified voter in the county, be of 'sound mind and good moral character,'
be literate, have no prior convictions, or be under pending indictment 'for any felony.'"
37. 430 U.S. at 497.
38. Id. at 501.
39. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed to proscribe discrimination in employment.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1976).
40. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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of proof in a Title VII case. Initially, the complainant must establish a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. 41 Then, if the complainant is successful
in this, the burden shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the [complainant's] rejection."42 Finally, if the em-
ployer meets this burden, the complainant is then given the opportunity to show
that the employer's reasons were, in fact, a pretext for discrimination.43 The
Court noted that statistics relating to an employer's hiring policy and practice
may be helpful in determining whether the employer's refusal to hire the com-
plainant conformed to a general pattern of discrimination. "
After reviewing the burdens of proof as set forth in Green, the Court in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States4 examined statistics
offered by the government to establish a prima facie case under Title VII. 11
The Court stated that previous cases have made it clear that "'[s]tatistical analyses
have served and will continue to serve an important role' in cases in which the
existence of discrimination is a disputed issue."'" Referring to the repeated
approval of statistical proof in jury selection cases, the Court declared that "statis-
tics are equally competent in proving employment discrimination." "8 The Court
found a violation of Title VII because the government had proved a primafacie
case of purposeful employment discrimination which had been inadequately rebut-
ted by the company.49
The recent case of Bazemore v. Friday"0 involved the use of multiple regres-
sion analysis to demonstrate that blacks within the North Carolina Agricultural
Extension Service were paid less than similarly situated whites. 11 The United
States' expert used four independent variables, namely race, education, tenure
41. 411 U.S. at 802 (While facts will vary from case to case, a prima facie case of racial discrimination
is generally established where the complainant can show that (1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied
and met the qualifications for a job in which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) complainant, despite
his qualifications was rejected; and (4) after complainant's rejection, the employer continued to seek appli-
cants with the same qualifications as complainant.).
42. 411 U.S. at 802.
43. Id. at 804.
44. Id. at 805.
45. 431 U.S. 324 (1977); see also Griggs v, Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Davis v. Cook,
80 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. Ga. 1948), rev'd, 178 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1949).
46. Id. at 337. The government alleged that a trucking company had engaged in a pattern or practice
of discrimination against blacks and Spanish-surnamed Americans. 431 U.S. at 326. In support of their con-
tention, the government offered proof that of the company's 6,472 employees, only 314 (5 %) were Negroes
and 257 (4%) were Spanish-surnamed Americans. Id. at 337.
47. Id. at 339 (quoting Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1976)).
48. 431 U.S. at 339.
49. Id. at 342. In Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), the Court again
noted the importance of statistics as a source of proof in employment discrimination cases, and found that
the statistics offered established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 307-13. In this case,
the government alleged that the St. Louis School District was engaged in a "pattern or practice" of teacher
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII. That statute became applicable to the School District
in March of 1972. Id. at 301. In support of this contention, the government offered statistics showing that
in 1972-73, the percentage of blacks on Hazelwood's teaching staff was 1.4% in contrast to a percentage
of 5.7% qualified black teachers in the area.
50. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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and job title, to prepare multiple regression analysis relating to salaries in the
years 1974, 1975 and 1981. 52 The district court refused to accept this statisti-
cal evidence and entered judgment for the Extension Service. 1a The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the district court was correct
in rejecting the statistical evidence because "[a]n appropriate regression analy-
sis of salary should . . . include all measureable variables thought to have an
effect on salary level." 4 Because the multiple regression analysis offered by
the government did not consider all variables, the court of appeals concluded
that the analysis could not be considered acceptable as evidence of discrimina-
tion. 11
The Court found that the lower court was plainly incorrect in its view of
the evidentiary value of regression analysis. 11 While failure to include varia-
bles may make the analysis less probative, the Court noted that "it could hardly
be said, absent some other infirmity, that an analysis which accounts for the
major factors 'must be considered unacceptable as evidence of discrimination.'""
Further, the Court noted that clearly "a regression analysis that includes less
than 'all measureable variables' may serve to prove a plaintiff's case . . . . [A] s
long as the court may fairly conclude, in light of all the evidence, that it is more
likely than not that impermissible discrimination exists, the plaintiff is entitled
to prevail."" The case was remanded with instructions to examine the entire
evidence in the record relating to salary disparity. 51
The above cases illustrate the areas where the Court is willing to accept
statistical evidence as prima facie proof of discrimination. In successful Title
VII cases, the Court enforces a statute enacted to eliminate racial discrimina-
tion in public and private employment. Therefore, a high degree of scrutiny
is applied to suspect practices. b0 In jury selection cases, the Court applies an
equally high degree of scrutiny in examining facially neutral jury selection
procedures. 6
IV. INSTANT CASE EQUAL PROTECTION RATIONALE
In McCleskey the Court assumed the validity of the Baldus study, but found
it insufficient to create a primafacie case of purposeful discrimination. 62 The
51. Id. at 398-99.
52. Id. The variables were used because during discovery testimony an Extension Service official stated
that education, tenure, job title and job performance were used to determine salary levels. Id.
53. Id. at 386.
54. 751 F.2d 662, 672 (1 lth Cir. 1984).
55. ld.
56. 478 U.S. at 400.
57. Id.
58. id.
59. Id. at 404.
60. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 550 (3d ed. 1986).
61. Id. at 544-47.
62. 481 U.S. at 297.
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Court distinguished the Baldus study from the type of statistical research used
in Title VII and jury selection cases 63 by observing that the statistical research
in those cases involved: 1) fewer decision-makers; 64 2) fewer variables that
were "relevant to the challenged decisions;" 6  and finally, 3) decision-makers
in those cases had an opportunity to explain any statistical discrepancy. 66 The
Court further emphasized the importance of prosecutorial discretion in the crimi-
nal justice process, and stated that it "would demand exceptionally clear proof
before [inferring] that the discretion had been abused." 7 Justice Blackmun,
in his dissent, stated that the Court treated McCleskey's claim as if it only
challenged the acts of the jury and the state legislature . 68 The dissent thought
the majority was incorrect because the majority distinguished this case from
Title VII and jury selection cases without considering the role the prosecutor
plays in the capital sentencing process . 6  By recognizing the prosecutor's role,
the Court could have easily examined the issues raised by the Baldus study using
the same standard of review found in Title VII and jury selection cases."
V. BACKGROUND: EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
In the second part of the opinion, the Court examined McCleskey's allega-
tion that the Baldus study demonstrated that the Georgia death penalty system
violated the eighth amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment." 7
In addressing this claim, the Court delineated the "constitutionally permissible
range of discretion in imposing the death penalty" 72 which has developed. A
state must set forth rational criteria which sufficiently narrow a decision-maker's
judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case war-
rants imposition of the death penalty. 73 The state, however, may not limit the




67. Id. at 297 (The Court noted two additional concerns underlying their decision. Acceptance of
McCleskey's claim, based on the Baldus study, could open the door to claims based on a statistical study
indicating any arbitrary variable as influential in the jury's decisionmaking process. Id. at 1779-81. Further,
McCleskey's arguments constituted legislative and not judicial concerns. Id. at 1781.
In response to the Court's "slippery slope" concerns, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, stated that the majori-
ty disregarded the sophistication of the Baldus study and overlooked the moral and constitutional ramifica-
tions of racial discrimination as compared with any other arbitrary variable that may be brought into question.
Id. at 1792. He also responded to the Court's statement that McCleskey's claims ought to be presented to
the legislature. Justice Brennan observed that the relatively few who face the possibility of receiving the
death penalty are not in the position to be heard above the majority of the population's demand for punish-
ment. Id. at 1793.).
68. Id. at 350 (Blackmun, J., joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Brennan, dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
72. 481 U.S. at 305.
73. ld.; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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consideration of any circumstances which may cause the decision-maker to refrain
from imposing the death penalty. 74 Further, a state may not impose the death
penalty where society would consider it disproportionate to the crime commit-
ted. ? To understand this standard, it is important to review the decisions which
led to its development. 76
A. Statutory Limitation on Juror Discretion
In the 1971 case of McGuautha v. California, "1 petitioners claimed that
permitting the jury to impose the death penalty without any set criteria to govern
their decision violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 78
The Court rejected this contention and stated that "the States are entitled to as-
sume that jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing
death for a fellow human being will act with due regard for consequences of
their decision and will consider a variety of factors.
' 79
One year later, in Furman v. Georgia, 80 the Court seemed to have retreated
from this view when directly faced with the issue of whether imposition of the
death penalty constituted 'cruel and unusual' punishment in violation of the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. 8' A five-to-four majority, per curiam, held that
"the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sen-
tence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wan-
74. 481 U.S. at 306. See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
75. 481 U.S. at 306; see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (where the Court invalidated a death
sentence for the crime of rape); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (where Enmund waited
in the car while his two co-defendants robbed a home. In the course of the robbery the victims resisted and
both were shot. Enmund, found to be a constructive aider and abettor under Florida law, was sentenced
to death. The Court invalidated the death sentence, stating that it was "an excessive penalty for the robber,
who, as such, does not take human life." Id. at 797.). But see Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987)
(where the Court held that the eighth amendment does not ban imposition of the death penalty on a defendant
who did not inflict the fatal wounds, but whose participation in the felony resulting in the murder was major
and his mental state was one of "reckless indifference to human life." Id. at 1688.).
76. In the earliest cases, the issue was not whether the sentence of death itself was unconstitutional, but
rather whether a particular method of punishment was "too cruel to pass constitutional muster." 107 S. Ct.
at 1770 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)); see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879). In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a punishment involving 12 years hard labor in chains for the crime of falsifying an offi-
cial document. Finding the punishment unconstitutional, the Court stated that the eighth amendment not only
reaches punishments that are "inhuman and barbarous," but also extends to punishment that is disproportion-
ate to the particular offense involved. Id. at 366-67. Later, in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), Chief
Justice Warren pointed out that the "evolving standards of decency" within a society are important in assess-
ing the challenged punishment in an eighth amendment claim. id. at 101.
77. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
78. Id. at 185.
79. Id. at 208.
80. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
81. Each of the three black defendants in Furnan had been sentenced to death under statutes which gave
the judge or jury the discretion to impose the death penalty. Id. at 239.
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tonly and so freakishly imposed," 92 and thus invalidated the death penalty laws
of thirty-nine states and various federal provisions. The dissenting justices' main
concerns were the lack of trust in jurors, who are the "keystone in [the] system
of criminal justice,' 83 and also the lack of deference to legislative judgment
found in the concurring opinions. 84
In Gregg v. Georgia, 85 the Court was faced with the issue of whether "the
punishment of death for the crime of murder is, under all circumstances, 'cruel
and unusual' in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.""6 The
Court began analysis of this issue by noting that at least thirty-five states and
Congress had created new death penalty statutes since Furman, and found this
to clearly show that capital punishment had not been rejected by the people. 87
In the majority's opinion the utilization of capital punishment by juries also sup-
ported society's approval of the death penalty in appropriate cases. 81
Additionally, the Court considered the value of the death penalty as serv-
ing principal social purposes, namely, retribution and deterrence. 8 9 In light
of these considerations, "as well as respect for the ability of a legislature to
evaluate in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the
death penalty . . . [we] conclude . . . that the infliction of death as a punish-
ment for murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally
severe."
90
The new Georgia death penalty statute was found constitutional because
it provided for a bifurcated proceeding, it allowed the jurors to examine all
relevant circumstances in each particular case, and it required the jury to find
and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before imposing the death
penalty. 1' As an added precaution, every case involving a death sentence was
82. 408 U.S. at 310 (opinion of Justice Stewart). Each justice gave a separate concurring or dissenting
opinion in the Furman case, with the question being left open whether any death penalty, as opposed to
a randomly administered one, would be unconstitutional. While racial discrimination was not proven in Fur-
man, Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, stated that the discretionary statutes "are unconstitutional
in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible
with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments. "Id.
at 257. But see C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE, 67-68
(1974) (Stating that capital sentencing statutes will never effectively restrict jury discretion, for "no society
is going [to impose the death penalty] on everybody who meets certain present verbal requirements.").
83. Id. at 402 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 418 (Powell, J., dissenting).
85. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Gregg was sentenced to death under the post-Furman Georgia death penalty
statute for murder in the course of an armed robbery. Id. at 159.
86. Id. at 168.
87. Id. at 179-80 (A decade after Furman, 72% of the general public favored the death penalty. An ABA
poll further revealed that 69% of ABA member lawyers took the same position. Streib, Executions Under
the Post-Furman Capital Punishment Statutes, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 443, 483-84 n.413 (1984).).
88. Id. at 181-82.
89. Id. at 186-87.
90. Id. But see Black, Due Process For Death, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1976) (Where the author states
that to say that a legislature can effectively evaluate results of complex statistical studies is "nothing but
sheer fiction!" Id. at 14.).
91. 428 U.S. at 207.
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automatically reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court. 92
When Gregg pointed out the opportunities for discretionary action allowed
decision-makers "in the processing of any murder case under Georgia law,"
9 3
the Court chose to view these discretionary stages as opportunities for a decision-
maker to show mercy and to remove a defendant from consideration for the
death penalty. 94 There was no reference in the Court's opinion to the possibili-
ty that these stages may also provide an opportunity for impermissible biases
to enter the decision-making process.
B. Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances
In Lockett v. Ohio, 9s the issue was the validity of a death sentence im-
posed under a statute which did not allow the jury to consider all mitigating
circumstances surrounding a particular case. 96 The Court found that "the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's charac-
ter . . . and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death."
97
C. Comparative Review
A different constitutional challenge was raised in Pulley v. Harris98 when
the defendant, Harris, contended that the California death penalty system was
invalid because there was no provision for the California Supreme Court to com-
pare Harris' sentence with the sentences in similar cases to determine whether
the relative sentences were proportionate. 99 The Court disagreed with this con-
tention, stating that "comparative proportionality review" is not a requirement
92. Id. (While Georgia, Texas and Florida enacted new death penalty statutes designed to channel and
guide sentencing discretion, other states responded to Furman by enacting mandatory death penalties in lieu
of discretionary jury sentencing. On the same day Gregg was decided, the Court invalidated North Carolina's
and Louisiana's mandatory death statutes. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 280 (1976), the Court
noted: "N.C.'s mandatory death statute provides no standards to guide the jury. Furthermore, the statute
contains no provision allowing for the judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious exercise [of the jury's dis-
cretionary power] through a review of death sentences." Id. at 303); see also Stanislaus Roberts v. Loui-
siana, 429 U.S. 325 (1976).
93. Id. at 199.
94. Id.
95. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
96. Id. at 597 (Specifically, Lockett alleged that the Ohio death penalty statute did not permit the sen-
tencing judge to consider, as mitigating factors, "her character, prior record, age, lack of specific intent
to cause death and relatively minor part in the crime." Id.).
97. Id. at 604; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (where a 16 year old was tried as
an adult for murder. The trial judge would not consider evidence relating to the boy's harsh upbringing.
The Court stated that while the sentencer and the state appellate court "may determine the weight to be given
relevant mitigating evidence," it is improper for them not to give it any weight by excluding such evidence
from their consideration. Id. at 129.).
98. 465 U.S' 37 (1984).
99. Id. at 39-40.
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when other procedures within the sentencing system provide adequate protec-
tion from the risk of an arbitrarily imposed sentence. 100
D. Imposition of the Death Penalty by a Judge
In 1984, another constitutional challenge was raised in Spaziano v.
Florida. 101 In that case, the trial judge imposed a death sentence, disregarding
the jury's recommendation of a life sentence for the defendant. 102 The Court
rejected the contention that this was in violation of the eighth amendment, stat-
ing that the death sentence may be imposed by either the jury or a judge be-
cause the "community's voice is heard at least as clearly in the legislature when
the death penalty is authorized and the particular circumstances in which death
is appropriate are defined," 1"3 as when the community voice is evidenced by
a jury decision.
VI. INSTANT CASE EIGHTH AMENDMENT RATIONALE
Under eighth amendment analysis, the Court in the instant case rejected
McCleskey's claim that his sentence was disproportionate and had been imposed
in an arbitrary manner. 104 Instead, the Court found that the Baldus study "did
not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the
Georgia capital-sentencing process." 105 While conceding that some risk of ra-
cial bias may enter jury decisions, the Court pointed out that the discretion al-
lowed jurors and prosecutors within the system often benefitted a defendant. 106
The Court stated further that the value of trial by jury underlies the entire ad-
ministration of criminal justice, for it is the jury who speaks as the "conscience
of the community." 10 Finally, the Court held that safeguards have been deve-




Justice Brennan, in his dissent, responded to the Court's statement that juror
discretion is fundamental to our criminal justice system. 109 He explained that
while jurors must consider each defendant as a unique human being, the con-
sideration of race as a factor in decision-making strikes against the very reason
for granting sentencing discretion. 110 In this situation, the sentencer is not viewing
100. Id. at 50-54.
101. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
102. Id. at 551-52.
103. Id. at 462.
104. 481 U.S. at 306-13.
105. Id. at 313.
106. Id.
107. 481 U.S. at 310 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
108. 481 U.S. at 313.
109. Id. at 311-12.
110. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens, dissenting).
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the defendant as a unique human being, but rather is categorizing the individu-
al according to his color. I Justice Brennan thought that the majority could
not simply assume that Georgia's statutory safeguards were sufficient to chan-
nel the sentencer's discretion, for it was the very effectiveness of these safeguards
that the Baldus study called into question. 1I2 In this context, "[the] Court thus
fulfills, rather than disrupts, the scheme of separation of powers by closely
scrutinizing the imposition of the death penalty, for no decision of a society
is more deserving of a 'sober second thought.' 1 '3
VII. ANALYSIS
While conceding the validity of the Baldus study, the Court nevertheless
emphasized that the study did not prove the existence of purposeful discrimina-
tion in McCleskey's particular case. 114 In contrast to the decision in McCleskey,
the Court has accepted statistical evidence in jury selection and Title VII cases. I I I
Further, the Court has consistently found such statistics to create a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination. 1 6 This is true even in jury selection cases
where the Court is not enforcing a statute specifically enacted to prohibit racial
discrimination, as it is in Title VII cases. 117 The subjective nature of the jury
selection procedures is a major factor explaining the high degree of scrutiny
the Court employs in these situations. 118 Even more important'is that the Court
has used the same standard of review where a prosecutor was alleged to have
been exercising his right to peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner. 119
Considering the discretion allowed both prosecutor 2 0 and jury '2' in the
death penalty process, the acts of these decision-makers should be scrutinized
just as closely as the acts of administrators in jury selection procedures or Title
VII situations. However, in McCleskey, the Court was unwilling to accept the
Baldus study as sufficient prima facie proof of discrimination. In support of
this decision, the Court noted that the study challenged Georgia's criminal justice
system-laws which are necessary to protect the citizens of Georgia. Believing
111. Id.
112. Id. at 338.
113. Id. at 343 (quoting Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (1936)).
114. 481 U.S. at 292-93.
115. See supra notes 22-59 and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. J. NoWAK, supra note 60, at 544-50.
118. Id. at 545; see Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
119. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
120. This discretion is generally susceptible to abuse. See infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
121. Under Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and cases thereafter, the juror's discretion is suffi-
ciently narrowed where a juror, considering all relevant circumstances, finds at least one statutory aggravat-
ing factor before imposing the death penalty. ld. at 207. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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that discretion is "essential to the criminal justice process,"' 22 the Court stated
that it would "demand exceptionally clear proof" before inferring that this dis-
cretion had been abused. 123
A. Separation of Jurors' Roles From the Prosecutors Role
Admittedly, the value and privilege of a jury trial is fundamental to the
criminal justice system and the decision to impose the death penalty was, in
McCleskey's case, made by a "petit jury selected from a properly constituted
venire." 124 While the results of the Baldus study challenged the sufficiency of
the safeguards "designed to minimize racial bias," 25 the Court correctly pointed
out that an attempt to deduce a consistent policy from the decisions of hundreds
of juries, each made up of twelve unique individuals, is extremely difficult. 126
True, as well, is the fact that jurors "cannot be called . . . to testify to the motives
and influences that led to their verdict."
127
Analysis of the prosecutor's role in the death penalty process does not present
these problems. The prosecutor alone has a large amount of control over the
number of defendants sent to death row. 128 This control occurs in three areas
where he has the opportunity to intervene in the criminal process. First, it is
the prosecutor who formulates the criminal charge determining whether or not
the death penalty is permissible if a conviction is obtained. 129 Second, he has
virtually complete discretion in deciding whether to offer a life sentence in ex-
change for a guilty plea in cases where a death sentence is possible and a plea
bargain is appropriate. 130 Third, after conviction, the prosecutor may or may
not demand that the trial proceed to the death penalty stage. 131 The jury does
not enter the death sentencing process until after the prosecutor has made the
appropriate decisions leading to their involvement. 132 By separating the prose-
cutor's role in seeking the death penalty from the jury's role in imposing the
death penalty, the factors that the Court used to distinguish the Baldus study
122. 481 U.S. at 297.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 294.
125. Id. at 313.
126. Id. at 295-96 n.15.
127. Id. (quoting Chicago B. & R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593 (1907)).
128. Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 456, 466 (1981); see also Grifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision: Enforcing
an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 659, 669 (1981) ("Existing controls on the prosecutor are inadequate
to guard against abuses in the charging decision."); McDaniel, Prosecutorial Discretion, 72 GEO. L. J. 365,
365-66 (1983) ("The prosecutor has broad authority to decide what charges to bring, when to bring them,
where to bring them, and whether to prosecute.").
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from statistics used in Title VII and jury selection cases are eliminated. 133 As
discussed in more detail below, these factors include: 1) the number of factors
affecting a decision; 2) the number of decision-makers; and 3) the availability
of an opportunity to explain any statistical disparity. It is difficult to reconcile
the Court's claimed "unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from . . . [the]
criminal justice system," 134 with the difficult, if not impossible, burden of es-
tablishing a prima facie case it placed on McCleskey in the instant case.
1. Number of Factors Affecting a Decision
The Court expressed the belief that there are fewer factors affecting a de-
cision in jury selection or Title VII cases than in McCleskey's case. 13 There-
fore, statistics showing a racially disparate impact in those cases may show
intentional discrimination simply because of the lack of alternative factors. 136
While a prosecutor may consider a number of relevant factors in deciding
whether to seek the death penalty, including strength of available evidence and
witness availability, credibility and memory, 137 these factors provide a com-
mon standard for the prosecutor to assess each defendant's case. This is direct-
ly comparable to an employer who must review numerous relevant factors in
making an employment decision, or to a jury commissioner who must consider
an array of factors in determining whether a citizen is "upright" or "intelligent"
so as to be eligible for jury duty. 138 Since a prosecutor considers an equivalent
number of factors in making his decision as does an employer or jury commis-
sioner, it is inaccurate to distinguish McCleskey's case from jury selection or
Title VII situations on this basis.
In Bazemore v. Friday, 139 a Title VII situation, the Court emphasized how
"a regression analysis that includes less than 'all measurable variables' may serve
to prove a plaintiffs case [of purposeful discrimination]."140 According to statisti-
cal experts submitting an amicus brief in support of McCleskey, "the likeli-
hood that any omitted variable could significantly affect Baldus's . . . findings
133. See infra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
134. 481 U.S. at 309 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986)).
135. 481 U.S. at 294-96 (The Court pointed out that the factors in jury selection cases are limited by
state statute). See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (jury commissioners may exclude from grand
jury service those citizens that are not "upright" and "intelligent"); see also supra note 37. As to factors
involved in employment decisions, the Court stated that: "while employment decisions may involve a num-
ber of relevant variables, these variables are to a great extent uniform for all employees because they must
all have a reasonable relationship to the employee's qualifications to perform the particular job." 481 U.S. at 279.
136. Brief Amicus Curiae by State of California, by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General and County
of Los Angeles, by Ira Reiner, District Attorney, for Respondent at 25, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987) (No. 84-6811).
137. 481 U.S. at 307 n.28.
138. Id. at 295 n.14.
139. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
140. Id. at 400.
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is negligible."141 This is especially true because of the numerous variables that
were taken into account. For an unaccounted variable to actually make a differ-
ence in the Baldus study results, "it would have to be substantially correlated
with the race of the victim and yet substantially uncorrelated with the 230 vari-
ables defined by Professor Baldus . . . . It is extremely unlikely that any fac-
tor that powerful has been overlooked in [his] study." 142 In light of the detail
and sophistication of the Baldus study, it is difficult to understand why the Court
did not follow the reasoning in Bazemore, at least to the extent of accepting
the Baldus study as proving a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
2. Number of Decision-makers
The Court also believed that there is a greater number of decision-makers
in a capital sentencing case than in a Title VII case or a jury selection situa-
tion. 143 Since fewer decision-makers are involved in the latter cases, it is much
easier to statistically show a consistent policy of the particular decision-maker. '"
Yet the Baldus study demonstrated that the race of the victim is an especially
significant factor at the point at which the prosecutor decides whether or not
to proceed to the death sentencing phase. 145 This effect was demonstrated in
Fulton County, the county where McCleskey was tried and sentenced and also
at the statewide level. 14 In regard to the Fulton County statistics, the Court
stated that "the statistics in Fulton County alone represent the disposition of
[a relatively few number of] cases . . . . [T]he weight to be given the results
gleaned from this small sample is limited." 147 It is difficult to understand why
statistics demonstrating discriminatory prosecutorial decisions, that correlate
with statewide statistics, 148 were found insufficient to even require the State's
rebuttal. "I The decisions were made solely by prosecutors within Fulton
County, a group small enough where any "unexplained statistical discrepancy" 
150
could more easily be attributed to a consistent policy of the decision-makers.
These statistics were based on 629 cases, and were consistent with statewide
statistics based on a much larger group. 151
141. Brief Amicus Curiae by Dr. Franklin M. Fisher, Dr. Richard 0. Lempert, Dr. Peter W. Sperlich,
Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Professor Hans Zeisel, and Professor Franklin E. Zimring for Petitioner at 22.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811).
142. Id.
143. 481 U.S. at 295.
144. Id. at 295 n.14.
145. 481 U.S. at 353-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
146. 481 U.S. at 353-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. 481 U.S. at 295-96 n.15.
148. 481 U.S. at 356 n. 11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. 481 U.S. at 293-95.
150. Id. at 295 n.15.
151. Id. at 356 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
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3. Opportunity to Explain Statistical Disparity
The Court further distinguished McCleskey's case from the jury selection
and Title VII cases. In the latter cases, "the decision-maker has an opportunity
to explain the statistical disparity."152 The Court noted that because of the wide
discretion traditionally given prosecutors, it would be improper to require them
to defend their decisions to seek death penalties. 151
With respect to this proposition, it is important to note Justice Blackmun's
dissenting opinion in which he states: "[tihe Court's refusal to require that the
prosecutor provide an explanation for actions . . . is completely inconsistent
with this Court's longstanding precedent."154 Justice Blackmun cited Imbler
v. Pachtman '55 which held that a prosecutor acting within the scope of his duties
was immune from an action for damages. 156 The Court in that case, however,
noted that this did not mean that a prosecutor would never have to account for
his decisions. 157 The recent case of Batson v. Kentucky 158 demonstrates that
prosecutorial action is reviewable. In Batson, the Court recognized that a prose-
cutor could be required to rebut a prima facie case formulated against him,
evidencing a racially discriminatory exercise of his peremptory challenges. 159
In comparison, the Court in the instant case found it improper to question
prosecutorial motive when confronted with statistical proof which was based
on hundreds of cases and which evidenced a racial disparity in the prosecutor's
decision to seek the death penalty. 16 Admittedly, McCleskey did not offer
particularized evidence in his case. 161 However, when the Baldus study is
considered only in terms of the prosecutor's role, the adequacy of these statis-
tics is directly comparable to the adequacy of statistics accepted as prima facie
proof of discrimination in jury selection and Title VII cases. 162 Statistical evi-
dence this comprehensive should have been sufficient to overcome the Court's
deference to "policy considerations" underlying the traditional discretion allowed
prosecutors. 163
B. Suggested Standard of Review
The Court in Batson remanded with instructions that the evidence demon-
152. Id. at 296.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 363 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
155. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
156. Id. at 429.
157. Id. at 428-29.
158. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
159. Id. at 96-98.
160. 481 U.S. at 356 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 292-93.
162. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
163. 481 U.S. at 296.
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strating a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges at the defen-
dant's trial should be analyzed under the Casteneda three part test. 164 Under
this test, a showing of express discriminatory purpose is not required. 165 In-
stead, the claimant must show that first, he is a member of a recognizable class
"singled out for different treatment"; 166 second, that there has been a "substan-
tial degree of differential treatment"; 67 and third, that the procedure is "sus-
ceptible of abuse."' 68 If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts
to the prosecutor to come forward with a neutral explanation for his actions.
If the prosecutor cannot establish this explanation, the petitioner's conviction
should be reversed. 169 Thus, the Court held the prosecutor to the same stan-
dard as administrators of jury selection processes. 170 Batson involved discrimi-
nation in choosing a jury, the central duty of which is to act as a safeguard
against "the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge.""'7 The state
contended that the prosecutor's "privilege of unfettered exercise of the [peremp-
tory] challenge is vital [to the criminal justice system]."' 72 In response, the
Court stated that requiring courts to be wary of racially discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges "enforces the mandate of equal protection and furthers
the ends of justice." 7 '
In contrast, the Court in the instant case demanded "exceptionally clear
proof" before inferring that "discretion essential to the criminal justice process"
had been abused. "I The discrepancy is difficult to justify. Where statistics
as comprehensive as the Baldus study indicate an abuse of prosecutorial discre-
tion throughout a death penalty process, the Court should apply the same degree
of scrutiny to the prosecutor's actions as provided in Batson. Generally, the
separation of powers doctrine prevents judicial interference with a prosecutor's
discretion to conduct criminal prosecutions. 17 However, this does not relieve
the Court from its duty to scrutinize evidence which substantiates an allegation
164. 476 U.S. at 96-98.
165. 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977).
166. Id. at 494.
167. 481 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) Blackmun is applying.the "rule of exclusion" method
of proof. Id. at 352 n. 6.
168. 430 U.S. at 494-95.
169. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 86.
172. Id. at 98.
173. Id.
174. 481 U.S. at 297.
175. See United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 783 (9th Cir. 1985) (court reluctant to substitute its judg-
ment for prosecutor's in deciding when indictment should issue), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986); United
States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir.) (principle of prosecutorial discretion grounded in separa-
tion of powers), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir.)
(Constitutional authority for faithful execution of laws textually committed to executive branch), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 846 (1982).
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of discrimination in prosecutorial decisions. 176 The assumption that the jury
will act as a safety net for any "arbitrary exercise of power by the prosecutor" 
17 7
cannot be used to excuse discriminatory behavior on the part of the prosecutor.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Court in McCleskey placed an extraordinarily heavy burden of proof
on the petitioner when compared to cases where statistics have been accepted
as proof of discrimination. The statistics proffered as evidence of discrimina-
tory prosecutorial conduct should have been analyzed under the less burden-
some Casteneda three part test. Whenever a prima facie case is established under
this analysis, as it was in Batson, 178 the prosecutor should be made to bear
the burden of establishing a neutral basis for his actions. 179
LeAnn W. Mercer
176. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979) (The government is free to prosecute
under any statute violated by defendant, as long as prosecution is not discriminatory.); Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (The equal protection clause prohibits selective enforcement of a statute where such
selection was "based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification." Id.).
177. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
178. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens and Brennan, stated that un-
der this standard, "McCleskey's showing is of sufficient magnitude that, absent evidence to the contrary,
one must conclude that racial factors entered into the decisionmaking process." 481 U.S. at 359 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
179. 476 U.S. at 97; see supra notes 21-38 and accompanying text.

